I write this note not as a commentator, but as someone who has been directly involved in the realities of Regional Internet Registry (RIR) governance, particularly at AFRINIC.

What has become increasingly clear to me is that many RIRs now suffer from a structural failure disguised as process, and from power concentration disguised as “community.” Over time, policies and procedures have grown so complex and opaque that they primarily benefit a small circle of insiders who understand how to navigate—and shape—the system. An entire ecosystem of “RIR consultants” now exists to interpret rules they often helped design, profiting from a maze that ordinary members neither have the time nor incentive to master. This is not healthy governance; it is regulatory capture by complexity.

This insider advantage extends beyond policy into governance itself. The same small group of individuals tends to rotate through committees, advisory councils, and board positions, supporting one another’s candidacies and proposals year after year. Independent or reform-minded voices face structural resistance, not through open debate, but through procedural exclusion. At AFRINIC, this dynamic became explicit when rules were bent to extend terms and block candidates perceived as outsiders. Such actions hollow out the democratic claim of the institution while preserving the appearance of legitimacy.

Meanwhile, most AFRINIC members—ISPs, telecom operators, enterprises actually building and operating networks—are disengaged. Many do not even realize they have voting rights or influence. Their focus is understandably operational, not institutional politics. The consequence is predictable: when participation is low, a disciplined minority dominates. This is not unique to AFRINIC, but AFRINIC demonstrates the risk most starkly. When “community governance” relies on participation that never materializes, it ceases to be community governance at all.

At the core lies a deeper philosophical flaw: the doctrine of “community ownership” of IP addresses as it is currently practiced. In theory, no one owns the resource; the community collectively stewards it. In practice, this has produced centralized authority with weak accountability. A registry staff and a narrow set of active participants end up exercising control in the name of everyone else. History shows this pattern repeatedly: when something is said to belong to everyone, it is often controlled by a few who claim to act on everyone’s behalf. The language is democratic; the power structure is not.

The solution is not cosmetic reform but structural change. IP address governance must be decentralized in practice, not just in rhetoric. Member organizations must be treated as real stakeholders with enforceable rights, not as passive beneficiaries of registry discretion. Participation should be direct, informed, and unavoidable—not optional theater dominated by insiders. RIRs should evolve from gatekeepers into coordinators, with address holders recognized as long-term custodians or owners rather than tenants subject to unilateral revocation.

This is not a radical idea; it aligns with broader technological and institutional trends toward decentralization. Systems work better when power is distributed, transparent, and constrained. An internet whose critical resources are governed by small, self-perpetuating circles is fragile by design. An internet where authority rests with those who actually deploy and rely on those resources is more resilient.

The events at AFRINIC should be understood as a warning, not an anomaly. Without reform, similar failures will recur elsewhere. The era in which a small clique can control essential internet resources under the banner of “community” should end. Genuine decentralization—rooted in real rights, real participation, and real accountability—is not optional if we want a stable and fair internet governance system.